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After Russia withdrew from WWI, the Allied nations worried about Germany relocating 
its eastern front forces to the western front. Britain and France both urged the United States to 
militarily intervene in Russia to reopen the eastern front. Although President Wilson initially 
ignored this proposition of the Allied nations, he reconsidered in 1918 and ordered troops to 
Russia. Many scholars have examined the US intervention in Russia and debated why Wilson 
decided to use American troops in Russia. The preoccupation among historians as to why these 
troops were sent to Russia has caused them to overlook the underlying reasons the intervention 
failed. Sparked by the alleged 1919 mutiny in North Russia, Wilson was forced to consider 
withdrawing troops from Russia, which eventually occurred in 1920. With the withdrawal of U.S 
troops, the intervention in North Russia proved to be unsuccessful because Wilson gave British 
commanders control over U.S. troops, he refused to send reinforcements to north Russia, and he 
refused to define the ultimate goal of the expeditionary force, which ultimately crippled 
American troop morale. 
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President Ronald Reagan announced in 1984, "To the people of the Soviet Union, it's true 
that our governments have had serious differences. But our sons and daughters have never fought 
each other in war. And if we Americans have our way, they never will."1 The president had 
ignored the history of the Polar Bear Mission where United States soldiers indeed fought and 
died on the battlefield in North Russia against the Soviets between the years 1918 and 1919. A 
small army of 5000 US soldiers landed in the ports of Archangel and Murmansk in fall of 1918. 
In a New York Times poll in 1985, only 14 percent of Americans knew that troops landed in 
Russia. These facts show that over the past 90 years, the Polar Bear mission has been forgotten 
and muddled in history. 
The events that led up to the U.S. intervention in Russia started after the United States 
entered WWI. Shortly after the U.S. joined the war effort, Russia withdrew its forces because of 
the Russian civil war where the Bolsheviks claimed victory. After much negotiation, the 
Germans and Russians, signed the peace Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, which gave Germany much 
land and raw resources. With German reinforcements now able to transfer from the eastern front 
to the western front, the Allies became concerned about their western front positions.2 Britain 
 
and France concluded under these new conditions the Allies must establish an eastern front 
through a military intervention in Russia, and in June, the Supreme War Council recommended 
sending a joint allied force to Murmansk and Archangel Russia.3 The Allied commanders 
concluded that the ice free ports of Murmansk and Archangel held great strategic importance 
because of their location near the railroad system, which connected these cities to Petrograd. 
 
 
1 David S. Foglesong, America's Secret War against Bolshevism: U.S. Intervention in the Russian Civil War, 1917- 
1920 (London: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 26. 
2 Ibid, 15. 
3 Leonid Strakhovsky, “The Allies and the Supreme Administration of the Northern Region August 2-October7. 
1918. A Page in the History of Allied Intervention in North Russia,” The American Association for the Advancement 
of Slavic Studies 1 (1941): 102. 
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They believed that possession of these ports would enable Allied forces to reopen the eastern 
front. 
While Britain and France asserted the necessity of an Allied intervention in Russia, 
President Wilson argued that the United States should not interfere in Russia. He proclaimed in 
his Fourteen Points Speech that all foreign governments should allow Russia an "opportunity for 
the independent determination of her own political development and national policy."4 Shortly 
thereafter, Wilson further expressed his opposition to a military intervention in Russia when he 
stated that the establishment of an eastern front "would be merely a method of making use of 
Russia, not a method of serving her."5 President Wilson believed that the Allies should allow a 
democratic Russian government to form.  Paradoxically, although President Wilson fervently 
opposed American intervention in Russia, he later ordered an American expeditionary force of 
over four thousand men to land on the frontiers of Russia where they would engage the Soviet 
forces. 
 
While Wilson intended to allow the Russian people to decide their own political future, 
his advisors persuaded him that the Germans had installed the Soviets into power and that the 
United States should in turn send an "experimental" probe of U.S. soldiers to Russia to spark a 
Russian uprising against the Soviets.6 This experimental probe proved to be unsuccessful 
because he gave British commanders control over U.S. troops, refused to send reinforcements to 
north Russia, and he refused to define the ultimate goal of the expeditionary force, which 
ultimately crippled American troop morale. 
 
 
 
4 Woodrow Wilson, “Wilson Proclaims U.S War Aims: The Fourteen Points, 1918” in Major Problems in American 
Foreign Relations, ed. Dennis Merrill (Boston: Wadsworth, 2005), 32. 
5 Foglesong, America's Secret War against Bolshevism, 202. 
6 PRFA, 1918, Supplement on Russia, Vol. II, pp. 287-290. 
4
Journal of Undergraduate Research at Minnesota State University, Mankato, Vol. 11 [2011], Art. 4
http://cornerstone.lib.mnsu.edu/jur/vol11/iss1/4
  
Many scholars have looked into the apparent hypocrisy of Wilson's Fourteen Points 
address in light of his actions in North Russia, but they have not come to a consensus as to why 
Wilson ultimately ordered the intervention. George Kennan, in his 1958 piece Decision to 
Intervene, claimed that Wilson never really understood the events that took place in Russia.7 
Moreover, Betty Unterberger in her work Woodrow Wilson and the Bolsheviks "The Acid Test of 
Soviet-American Relations," argued that Wilson had no idea that American troops engaged 
Bolshevik forces and that he only agreed to send troops to North Russia as a way to appease 
coalition diplomacy.8 
Kennan's and Unterberger work came under scrutiny when revisionists such as William 
Appleman claimed in his American Intervention in Russia, 1917-1920 that anti- Bolshevik 
sentiment drove Wilson's decision for a military intervention.9 George Schild added support to 
this argument when he asserted that Wilsonian policy "alternated between ideological 
preconceptions and considerations of realpolitik."10 Further, David Foglesong wrote in America's 
Secret War Against Bolshevism: U.S. Intervention in the Russian Civil War, 1917-1920 that 
Wilson's Puritan upbringing gave him a natural disdain for the Bolsheviks. He asserted that a 
"Wilsonian style of intervention" used clandestine measures in an attempt to cripple the 
Bolshevik government, which ultimately failed.11 This "Wilsonian style of intervention" 
stemmed from Wilson's experience with the intervention in the Mexican revolutionary war, 
where he waged military and economic warfare against Mexico. Most scholars have concluded 
that George Kennan's groundwork about the intervention was important; however, revisionists 
7 George Frost Kennan, The Decision to Intervene: Soviet-American Relations 1917-1920, vol. 2 (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1989). 
8 Betty Unterberger, "Woodrow Wilson and the Bolsheviks "The Acid Test of Soviet-American Relations," 
Diplomatic History 11 (Spring 1987):71. 
9 David McFadden, “Did Wilson Have a Russia Policy?” The Johns Hopkins University Press 24, no. 4 (1996): 624. 
10Ibid. 
11 Foglesong, America's Secret War against Bolshevism. 
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such as Appleman, Schild, and Foglesong concluded that Wilson did in fact create a policy on 
the intervention in North Russia, which now most historians accept. 
While some historians believed that U.S. military intervention in North Russia went 
against Wilson's belief of self-determination, Wilson himself declared otherwise. Wilson 
approved the military intervention because he believed that the Bolsheviks power stemmed from 
German agents and that the Soviets did not represent the Russian people. Providing evidence that 
Germany meddled in Russian political affairs, Edgar Sisson, U.S Committee on Public 
Information officer stationed in Petrograd, Russia, informed President Wilson that "the present 
leaders of the Russian Bolshevik government were installed by Germany."12 Ambassador 
Francis, the last ambassador to czarist Russia and a wealthy businessmen, lent support to these 
allegations when he wrote to the Secretary of State, "[I have seen] evidence that the Soviet 
government submits to German demands without protest and am almost convinced that Lenin 
and possibly Trotsky are pliable tools if not responsive German agents."13 General Poole further 
proclaimed in order to restore democracy in Russia the Soviet government should dissolve, 
which would enable allied forces to expel German influence in Russia.14 These reports helped 
convince President Wilson that the Bolshevik government was an unrepresentative government 
installed by a hostile power.15 
In addition to claiming that the Germans nefariously imposed themselves into Russian 
politics, American political figures in Russia provided evidence to Wilson that the Russian 
people fervently hated the Soviets and yearned for a new government. Ambassador Francis 
 
 
 
12 Ibid., 199. 
13 Francis to Secretary of State, May 23, 1918, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia, Pt. I:538. 
14 Poole to Secretary of State, May 24, 1918, FRUS, 1918, Russia, I:540. 
15 Foglesong, America's Secret War against Bolshevism,190. 
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predicted that the Russian people would indeed support a U.S. intervention when he wrote to 
Washington that, "Information from all sources demonstrates dissatisfaction with the Soviets and 
indicates that [an] Allied intervention would be welcomed by [the] Russian people."16 Three 
days later, Francis reported that the head of the Greek Church in Russia had claimed that the 
church would support a new government revision of the Brest Treaty.17 With one of the larger 
Church organizations in Russia aligning against the Soviets, the conversation lent credence to the 
idea that the Soviet government did not represent the Russian people. These depictions of 
Russian sentiment helped Wilson conclude that an Allied intervention in Russia would lead to an 
anti-Bolshevik movement among the Russian people, and in turn, help facilitate self- 
determination in Russia. Secretary of State Robert Lansing stated this as the U.S. policy towards 
Russia: 
 
In the view of the earnest desire of the people of the United States to befriend the 
Russian people and lend them all possible assistance in their struggle to reconstruct their 
nation upon principles of democracy and self-government.18 
To the disdain of Lenin, an agreement between the local Murmansk Soviet government 
and the Allies on July 6, 1918 for an Allied expedition landing finally pushed Wilson to back a 
U.S. intervention in Russia.19 Lenin angrily telegraphed the Murmansk Soviets about the deal 
 
with England by stating, "[England's] direct intention is overthrowing the workmen's and 
peasants power."20   Still being attacked by the Germans after the Brest-Litovsk treaty the Soviet 
Murmansk government replied, "It is all very well for you to talk that way, sitting there in 
 
 
 
 
 
16 Francis to Secretary of State, May 21, 1918, FRUS, 1918, Russia, I:538. 
17 Francis to Secretary of State, May 24, 1918, FRUS, 1918, Russia, I:540. 
18 U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, "Historical Files of the American Expeditionary Force, North 
Russia, 1918-1919,”M 924, Roll 2, 23-33.2. 
19 Halliday, When Hell Froze Over, 27. 
20 Ibid., 26. 
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Moscow."21 Wilson believed that this agreement between the English and Murmansk 
government formally showed that the Russian people invited foreign troops in Russia. However, 
uncertain of how vigorous the Russian people would respond to an Allied intervention, Wilson 
commented that he initiated a limited "experimental" military operation.22 On March 18, Wilson 
declared: 
 
The United States will avail itself of every opportunity to secure for Russia once more 
complete sovereignty and independence in her own affairs ... the whole heart of the 
people of the United States is with the people of Russia in the attempt to free themselves 
forever from autocratic government and become makers of their own fate.23 
President Wilson thoroughly believed it would help the Russian people by providing Allied 
troops to North Russia, and thus he was being consistent with the ideals that he proclaimed in his 
Fourteen-Point address or his March 18 speech. 
Although the Murmansk Soviet government had invited the Allies to North Russia, the 
British nevertheless planned to overthrow the local Soviets upon their arrival and install a 
democratic government. The British government sent funds to Commander George E. Chaplin of 
the Russian Navy to organize a counter-revolution in Archangel.24 The British hoped that on 
August 2, 1918 when British General Poole arrived in Archangel, an uprising against the current 
Soviet government would occur.  After the Soviets heard of the British intent to plan an uprising, 
the Soviets evacuated the city and fled south along the Dvina River.25 
British efforts to overthrow the local Soviet government provided Chaplin with the 
opportunity to organize a replacement government. Chaplin promised the British he would select 
 
 
21 Ibid. 
22 PRFA, 1918, Supplement on Russia, Vol. II, pp. 287-290. 
23 Halliday, When Hell Froze Over, 23. 
24 Strakhovsky, “The Allies and the Supreme," 103. 
25 Ibid. 
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a democratic government that held openly pro-Allied views.  Chaplin appointed a veteran 
socialist member of the "Union for the Regeneration of Russia" Nicholas V. Chaikovski. The 
new government quickly made a public announcement to the townspeople in Archangel, 
proclaiming, "The provisional government comes into existence under unique circumstances at a 
time when war is being waged against the Bolsheviks and Germans."26 The proclamation 
asserted an anti Bolshevik sentiment, which fulfilled the British demands for the new 
government to hold pro-Allied views. 
 
Although the Allies were satisfied with the Provisional Government's anti-Bolshevik 
views, problems with the government occurred before the United States expeditionary force 
arrived in North Russia. These problems centered on Chaikovski and his leadership. The Allied 
commanders complained that Chaikovksi refused to, "realize that his government very existence 
depended upon military support of the Allies."27 In addition to Chaikovski's arrogant style of 
governance, the Allied governments worried that most of the provisional government members 
were socialists.28 This ideological conflict then transformed into disputes over which group held 
ultimate authority between the Allied commanders and the provisional government. For 
example, the issuing of red flags across Archangel drew stern criticism from the Allied 
commanders. General Poole wrote to Chaikovski about removing the red flags; however, 
Chaikovski replied explaining why he used red flags. General Poole sternly replied, "I have the 
honor to inform you that the city of Archangel as well as the whole province are at present under 
martial law... Therefore I have given orders to the military not to permit any display of red flags 
 
 
 
 
 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid., 109. 
28 Ibid., 106 
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in Archangel."29 Through these letters, General Poole asserted his role as the chief commander of 
the Allied forces in Archangel and demonstrated his power was greater than Chaikovski. 
 
Allied suspicions about Chakiovksi prompted them to diminish his role as the head of the 
provisional government. Ambassador Francis commented, "The president [Chakiovksi] is a 
theorist, if not a dreamer."30 This pointed out that Chakiovksi did not hold pragmatist views 
about the problems his government faced. In turn, the Allies appointed a military governor to 
reduce the role of Chakiovksi to gain hold of the situation.31 The British government went a step 
further when it attempted a coup; however, the coup failed and Chakiovksi remained in power.32 
 
Upon the arrival of American troops, Chaikovksi remained in power, and the troops 
received a warm reception. A colonel of the U.S. Army J.A Ruggles commented, “The 
Bolshevik forces had fled from Archangel and the populace was waiting for us."33 A U.S. naval 
captain noted upon arrival that the populace "simply went wild with joy to an extent almost 
beyond imagination."34 In addition, C.T. Williams, Deputy Commissioner of the Red Cross, 
commented that peasants in North Russia generally viewed President Wilson favorably. The U.S 
troop's positive relations with the Russians would prove to be short lived after military 
operations against the Bolsheviks commenced. 
 
The positive feeling of American troops after their landing in North Russia quickly 
dissipated after Colonel George E. Stewart received orders from Washington to report to British 
 
 
 
 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid., 107. 
32 Ibid. 
33 U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, "Historical Files of the American Expeditionary Force, North 
Russia, 1918-1919,”M 924, Roll 2, 23-33.6. 
34 Halliday, When Hell Froze Over, 38. 
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General Poole.35 President Wilson allowed the supreme war council to declare that British 
commanders would command the northern Russian expeditionary force. President Wilson 
believed that if the British commanded the troops, his political accountability in the expedition 
could be minimized. This political decision led the U.S. troops and commanders to become 
quickly discouraged by the situation in Russia after the realization that the British commanded 
the entire North Russian Expeditionary Force. American Captain Martin commented that the 
"American troops in Russia had been loaned to the British for a certain period of time." He 
further stated that the day the American troops left Russia they would gain their American 
freedoms back.36 In the historical account of the Polar Mission, Lieutenant Lewis Janis noted that 
coupled with the frustration that the British General had overall command of the expeditionary 
force, a general belief among the American troops was that, “Many of the British officers were 
decorated with insignia of high rank but drew pay of low rank. It was done over and over again 
to give the British officer ranking authority over the American officers.”37 This showed the 
general sentiment concerning British officers commanding American officers did not settle well 
with American troops. 
 
In addition to U.S. commanders reporting to British commanders, the British ordered the 
American troops to the frontlines where the brunt of the battles occurred, which created ill 
feelings towards the British. C.T. Williams, reported, "The British high command has distributed 
the Allied Forces at nearly all the positions in which fighting with the Bolsheviks is likely to 
 
 
 
 
 
35 Ibid., 45. 
36 U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, "Historical Files of the American Expeditionary Force, North 
Russia, 1918-1919,”M 924, Roll 2, 23-36.1. 
37 Jahns, The History of the American Expedition Fighting the Bolsheviki Campaigning in North Russia 1918-1919, 
17. 
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occur."38   He portrayed the British command as putting American troops in the fiercest battles 
against the Bolsheviks instead of the British, creating harsh resentment among the American 
troops. A soldier from the Ambulance Company, Waggoner Weimiester, stated, "The British, we 
all hated, and I mean everybody."39 Weimiester showed that American troops resented the 
British. This resentment would create a low morale amongst the U.S. troops as they anguished 
over the losses of American soldiers under British command. 
 
In addition to the belief that American troops fought most of the battles against the 
Bolsheviks, many American troops thought the British commanders inefficiently managed the 
troops. According to Williams, "The allied forces in North Russia have been seriously 
mismanaged because of the inefficiency of the British."40 Further, Colonel Ruggles reported, 
"several of these British officers have been grossly inefficient."41 Lieutenant Mead worried that 
 
the British disregarded the safety of American troops. He commented: 
 
Allied intelligence was certain a larger force lurked nearby in the vast Arctic forest, and a 
strong attack was expected. In spite of this knowledge, British command had ordered A 
Company, without reinforcements, to hold the sector at all cost.42 
Ruggles concluded that the British leadership created "friction" between the U.S troops and the 
British. This mismanagement of the troops created harsh tensions amongst the Allied forces and 
ultimately affected U.S. troop morale. 
The friction between American troops and British commanders extended to a national 
level. Although President Wilson "gambled" that he could limit the expeditionary force to a 
 
 
38 U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, "Historical Files of the American Expeditionary Force, North 
Russia, 1918-1919,”M 924, Roll 1, 23-11.1. 
39Quartered in Hell, 181. 
40 U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, "Historical Files of the American Expeditionary Force, North 
Russia, 1918-1919,”M 924, Roll 1, 23-11.1. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Quartered in Hell, 181. 
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supportive role until the anti-Bolshevik forces gathered around the Allied "nucleus,"43 this wager 
failed when the British began to pursue their own objectives in North Russia. British leaders 
planned to expand their military expedition to the southeast in order to connect the 
Czechoslovakian forces to North Russia.44 David Foglesong asserted through his research that 
President Wilson "exploded" with anger when he learned that the Allied forces had been sent 
southern the Ural Mountains.45 American General Tasker Bliss believed that the British planned 
for a more aggressive intervention.46 Although President Wilson gambled wrong about British 
policy in North Russia, he refused to withdraw American troops because of the fear that he 
would appear to alienate his allies during the war.47 
In addition to the British offensive strategy in Russia disturbing President Wilson, 
American troops looked upon the British strategy with great skepticism. The U.S. troops thought 
President Wilson sent them to take a defensive position in Archangel and secure munitions 
supplies under direct threat from German forces. However, after marching 200 miles south of 
Archangel, Ruggles commented, "[U.S. troops] believe that they are being used to further selfish 
designs of England upon Russian territory and resources."48 American soldiers believed that the 
 
British used the mask of creating an eastern front in order to pursue imperialistic goals. 
Weimeister commented in his diary, "There were no supplies. Actually the British wanted to 
occupy and conquer the state of North Russia in order to obtain the pine from the forests."49 
These comments reflected the great disdain U.S. troops held for the British leadership in North 
 
43 Foglesong, America's Secret War against Bolshevism,209. 
44 Ibid., 205. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid., 209. 
47 Betty Unterberger, "Woodrow Wilson and the Bolsheviks "The Acid Test of Soviet-American Relations," 
Diplomatic History 11 (Spring 1987):71. 
48 U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, "Historical Files of the American Expeditionary Force, North 
Russia, 1918-1919,”M 924, Roll 1, 23-11.1. 
49 Quartered in Hell, 179. 
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Russia. The skepticism of U.S. troops prompted Ruggles to fear that U.S. troops might refuse to 
obey their British commanders. He opined, "At the time grave doubts were expressed by many of 
our officers that orders for aggressive operations would be obeyed."50 
The U.S. expeditionary force began to doubt if fighting the Bolsheviks really helped the 
war effort against Germany. Although great doubt rippled through the American troops, British 
General Poole devised an aggressive strategy to deploy Allied forces down south through the 
Trans Siberian railroad. He assumed the Red Army comprised of starving peasants and the North 
Russian people "would rally behind the Allies."51 With these assumptions, he hoped the Russians 
in Archangel and Murmansk would create a massive volunteer army led by the new provisional 
government. This volunteer army would bolster the relatively small Allied in Russia. However 
realities on the ground proved to contradict General Poole's assumptions. In actuality, the Red 
Army resisted Allied forces instead of deserting, the North Russian people did rise en masse 
against the Bolsheviks, and the Allied force was too small to push its forces to Petrograd without 
American reinforcements. The British commander reluctantly retreated back to Archangel and 
Murmansk. This provided for a long winter as American troops wondered why they were 
fighting the Bolsheviks instead of the Germans, and President Wilson's had refused to send 
appropriate reinforcements. 
The British's initial offensive strategy proved to be successful against the unorganized 
and ill equipped Soviet army. A United States intelligence report revealed that food shortages 
and starvation threatened the entire Soviet Union.52 This made U.S. officials to believe that in 
 
 
50 U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, "Historical Files of the American Expeditionary Force, North 
Russia, 1918-1919,”M 924, Roll 1, 23-11.1. 
51 Halliday, When Hell Froze Over, 39. 
52 U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, "Historical Files of the American Expeditionary Force, North 
Russia, 1918-1919,”M 924, Roll 1, 23-11.1. 
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Petrograd the people started to turn anti-Bolshevik.53 Allied officials observed the food rations of 
the Soviet army were grossly inferior to the Allied rations.54 These reports suggested to the 
Allied commanders that the expeditionary force could take advantage of the dire situation in 
Russia and collapse the Soviet government. 
 
The Soviet army also faced shortages in necessary raw materials such as coal, which 
ultimately crippled the mobility of the Red Army. An extract from the Bolshevik Press stated, 
"The Riga Orlow Railway has stopped all goods traffic owing to shortage of coal."55 
Furthermore, in densely populated Petrograd, trains stopped running due to coal shortages and 
many of the towns lost electricity.56 The frequent stoppages in the railway system led the Allies 
to conclude that movement of Soviet reinforcements to the front would be difficult to 
accomplish. Moreover, with the lack of raw materials the Soviet Union army itself faced low 
morale problems.57 Allied intelligence confirmed that low amounts of essential resources pushed 
the Soviet army to the cusp of defeat. A U.S. intelligence report stated, "The Bolsheviks in 
Petrograd are showing signs of nervousness. The Obukhow, Liteyney, Troitksy, and Nicolai 
bridges have been mined."58 This showed that the Soviets expected the Allied offensive to reach 
Petrograd as they prepared for a last defensive stand. 
 
While the Allied offensive strategy appeared to have great success, the momentum of 
Poole’s campaign stopped abruptly after the realization that there would not be enough troops to 
support an Allied offensive down to Petrograd. Captain H.S. Martin of the United States Army 
 
 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
55 U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, "Historical Files of the American Expeditionary Force, North 
Russia, 1918-1919,”M 924, Roll 1, 23-23.1. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. 
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later argued, "I believed then and believe now that a strong Allied assistance in North Russia 
could have saved the entire situation... Our force was too small."59 The expeditionary force, 
which Wilson sent as an "experimental" force, proved too small for an aggressive operation 
against the Bolsheviks. 
 
Although Wilson hoped that the Russian populace would gallantly support the small 
expeditionary force, and fight the Bolsheviks, no massive volunteer Russian army evolved. The 
lack of local populous support ultimately forced the Allied troops to take a defensive stand 
against the struggling Soviets. A volunteer army did emerge after the expeditionary force landed 
in Russia, it was severely disorganized and suffered major defections.60 General Stewart 
commented that anti-communist Russian forces, "mutinied on two occasions and are generally 
credited with being unreliable and have little sympathy with the allies."61 Captain Moore further 
injected that the Russian troops were "liabilities" to the Allied effort. In effect, most of the Allied 
commanders held suspicious views about the Russian soldiers because they worried that they 
held Bolshevik views. After several field reports reached Newton Baker, Secretary of War, the 
United States government declared on September 26 that, "no gathering of any effective forces 
by the Russians is to be hoped for."62 After this date President Wilson would not send any 
reinforcements for the cause of an Allied offensive. This military decision led to the 
reorganization of Soviet forces and severely affected the morale of the United States troops. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
59 U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, "Historical Files of the American Expeditionary Force, North 
Russia, 1918-1919,”M 924, Roll 1, 23-11.4. 
60 Ibid. 
61 U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, "Historical Files of the American Expeditionary Force, North 
Russia, 1918-1919,”M 924, Roll 2, 23-33.2. 
62 Ibid. 
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After the British commanders abandoned the offensive in North Russia, they adopted a 
defensive position outside of Archangel and Murmansk which allowed the Soviets to re-group 
gain strength and set up punishing long ranged artillery attacks on Allied positions. 
The Bolsheviks used the foreign intervention as a propaganda tool to rally the Russian 
people to its cause. C.T. Williams of the American Red Cross noted, "The presence of the Allied 
Expedition in North Russia constitutes one of the strongest pillars of the Bolshevik 
government."63 The Soviets used the foreign intervention as a tool to facilitate anger of the 
Russian people against the Allied presence. For example, a leaflet handed out by the Soviets 
labeled "Antanta" depicted Uncle Sam and British capitalists holding leashes of anti-Bolshevik 
leaders.64 This propaganda for the Soviets proved successful, as the Soviet army grew stronger. 
A U.S. military intelligence summary stated, "Within the last two months the whole Bolshevik 
forces have been re-organized and a serious attempt is being made to create a large, well- 
disciplined army on a European model."65 Before long, the strengthened Soviet Army mounted 
an offensive against the Allies. An Allied intelligence report worriedly stated, "[the] enemy is 
systematically accumulating troops on all fronts with the view of a general offensive before the 
thaw."66   Furthermore, the reinvigorated Soviet army bombarded Allied positions with long 
ranged artillery.67 
 
Throughout late 1918 and early 1919, Allied officials pleaded with President Wilson to 
send reinforcements to Russia to counter the new Bolshevik offensive. The troops received 
 
 
63 U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, "Historical Files of the American Expeditionary Force, North 
Russia, 1918-1919,”M 924, Roll 1, 23-11.1. 
64 Foglesong, America's Secret War against Bolshevism, 142. 
65 U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, "Historical Files of the American Expeditionary Force, North 
Russia, 1918-1919,”M 924, Roll 1, 23-23.1. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid. 
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constant bombardments of artillery from the Soviets and faced a very cold winter. The majority 
of American troops stayed on the front lines and did not filter back to Archangel. General 
Stewart sent an urgent letter to the Secretary of War stating, "The enemy are becoming more 
numerous on all fronts and are more active. The allied command is small and we have no 
reserves."68 Wilson's administration did not respond to the calls for reinforcements. Further pleas 
by U.S military officials to the White House administration stated that knowledge of 
reinforcements would "improve the morale of troops after their long winter."69   Moreover, the 
British embassy in Russia made "urgent" appeals to the state department for reinforcements.70 
 
While the military officers of the Allied forces requested reinforcements, President Wilson 
maintained that the force should remain small in order to allow the Russian people to decide their 
own political fate. While President Wilson remained steadfast in his determination to keep the 
American Expedition Force small, Major Francis Riggs urged him to send reinforcements that 
would allow, "General Poole to move to more populous regions where he could secure 
volunteers."71 His refusal to heed this message depicted the ultimate shortcoming of Wilson's 
 
policy of no reinforcements. With Wilson refusing to send more troops, it paralyzed any effort to 
rally the Russian people against the Bolsheviks. 
On November 11, 1918, the Germans surrendered to the Allies, however, the battle 
against the Bolsheviks continued. With American troops coming home from the western front, 
and the American Expeditionary force continuing to fight against the Bolsheviks an anxious U.S. 
army waited to hear its official objective in Russia. Captain H.S Martin wrote: 
 
 
68 U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, "Historical Files of the American Expeditionary Force, North 
Russia, 1918-1919,”M 924, Roll 2, 23-33.2. 
69 U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, "Historical Files of the American Expeditionary Force, North 
Russia, 1918-1919,”M 924, Roll 1, 23-11.1. 
70 The British embassy to the department of state, 1918, FRUS, 1918, Russia, I:469. 
71 Quoted in Foglesong, America's Secret War against Bolshevism,209. 
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They [U.S. troops] stated that they were drafted to fight Germany, not the Bolsheviks. 
That they had been sent here to guard supplies and not carry on aggressive warfare; that 
after the signing of the Armistice with Germany their job was finished and if the 
government wanted them to stay on and fight Bolshevism it should say so and announce 
some definite policy regarding Russia.72 
American troops expected that President Wilson would explain why they still were fighting in 
North Russia, but to their dismay President Wilson fervently expressed to the press that the 
United States was not at war with the Bolsheviks.73 Captain Ruggles wrote to General Pershing, 
"The morale of our troop has been low since the signing of the armistice with Germany. The men 
and some of the officers seem unable to understand why they should be kept in Russia after 
fighting has stopped with Germany."74 These reports and letters depicted the American troop's 
weariness of fighting Russia. With the question of why they fought in Russia, American troop 
morale rapidly declined. 
 
After the signing of the Armistice, Chicago and Detroit press, home to most members of 
American Expeditionary force, depicted a dire situation in North Russia to their readers. The 
majority of the sources used by the newspapers came from censored letters sent from the 
soldiers. Usually, the newspapers published the exact letters in full.75 Moreover, sometimes the 
journalist would interpret the letters and even exaggerate the harsh conditions. The newspapers 
often produced political caricatures of the situation in North Russia. For example, after reports 
that Allied forces were outnumbered six to one in some battles, the Chicago Tribune depicted a 
large bear, symbolizing the Soviets, towering over a single American soldier.76 In addition, the 
newspapers started to question why American troops were still fighting in Russia if the war was 
 
 
72 U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, "Historical Files of the American Expeditionary Force, North 
Russia, 1918-1919,”M 924, Roll 1, 23-11.1. 
73 Ibid. 
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over. For instance, the Chicago Tribune published a cartoon that depicted two American soldiers 
in Archangel asking each other, "Say when did we declare war on Russia?"77 Furthermore, an 
editorial in the Chicago Tribune commented, "our men are dying for a cause, the purpose of 
which they are no more certain than we in America. America has not declared war on Russia, but 
Americans are killing Russians or are being killed by them."78   These editorials showed the 
American people that President Wilson did not have a policy in North Russia and that the 
American troops faced an enemy that outnumbered them. 
 
After the U.S. troops read some of the national papers, it had a significant impact on the 
American troop's morale. American troops became quickly discouraged about the object of their 
mission. Many times newspapers received their information from Soviet propaganda, which in 
turn predicted an ominous future for American troops. In the History of the American 
Expeditionary Force, written by three members of the American expedition, they recalled that: 
When a man's own home paper printed the same story [as Bolshevik propaganda] of the 
million men advancing on Archangel with bloody bayonets fixed, and told the horrible 
hardships the soldiers endured... many of them were indeed severe hardships although 
most of the news stories were overdrawn and untruthful... the doughboy's spirit was 
depressed.79 
The American newspaper stories eventually circulated in Archangel, which ultimately hurt 
American troop morale. After several months in battle against the Bolsheviks and reports from 
papers of their ultimate demise, the United States troops faced questions of how long before their 
positions would be overrun. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
77 Foglesong, America's Secret War against Bolshevism, 141. 
78 Ibid., 228. 
79 Joel Moore, Harry Mead and Lewis Jahns, The History of the American Expedition Fighting the Bolsheviki (Detroit: 
The Polar Bear Publishing Co., 1920), 224. 
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With news coverage painting an increasingly negative picture of the Expeditionary forces 
predicament, the local public the Midwest started to pressure their congressional representatives 
to bring their boys back home, which led to a bill that failed to withdraw the troops from North 
Russia. Republican house representative from Michigan J.M.C Smith read to the congress about 
his constituents appeal to bring the troops back home.80 Furthermore, Republican Senator Hiram 
Johnson of California took the lead to push for the return of the troops. Johnson sat on the Senate 
Armed Forces committee and voted against declaring war on Germany. The senator pushed the 
Secretary of State to reveal the actual objectives in Russia through a resolution, which ultimately 
failed. Moreover, he argued on the Senate floor that the United States had not declared war on 
Russia. Republican Senator Henry Lodge joined the effort for the call of the withdrawal of 
American troops. He argued that the President did not send enough troops to North Russia at the 
start and now that Germany surrendered, American troops should be brought home. On February 
14, the Senate voted on the bill S.R. 444 to withdraw American troops. However, the bill voted 
to a tie and the Vice President expectedly voted against the bill. The vote for the bill remained 
along party lines, where the Democrats backed the President and the Republicans voted to 
withdraw the troops. 
After the Senate failed to pass the resolution to withdraw United States troops from North 
Russia, American troops morale continued to decline which led to the alleged mutiny. On March 
30, 1919, a United States Sergeant ordered four men to load their sleds and move to the front. 
American Lieutenant May reported that the men refused to load their sleds and Captain Horatio 
Winslow "immediately" called a meeting of the men.81 Colonel Stewart met the men at the local 
 
 
80 Douglas Habib, “Playing Into the Hands of Isolationists: Woodrow Wilson's Russian Policy, 1918-1920” (Master's 
thesis, San Jose State University, 1995), 31. 
81 Quartered in Hell, 177. 
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Y.M.C.A and talked to the soldiers. According to Lieutenant May, the soldiers complained that, 
"They had never been supplied with an answer as to why they were there, but the Reds were 
trying to push them into the White Sea and that they were fighting for their lives."82 After an 
extended conversation, the men eventually agreed to move to the front, and Colonel Stewart 
noted that he did not take any disciplinary action against any of the soldiers.83 While the event 
seemed small and insignificant at the time, the official report to the Secretary of War was that a 
mutiny had occurred in Archangel. This report would lead to a whirlwind of speculation among 
the press and further the pressure on President Wilson to withdraw the United States troops. 
After receiving reports from the War Department that a mutiny had occurred, the papers 
published alarming accounts of the incident that created a backlash against the President's policy 
in North Russia. On April 11, the Washington Post headline read, "U.S. TROOPS MUTINY ON 
ARCHANGEL FRONT."84 This article noted that four soldiers had refused to go to the front and 
predicted that a "general mutiny" would occur if the troops were not withdrawn immediately.85 
The Washington Post claimed that four men started the mutiny while another 250 were 
involved.86 The article depicted harsh conditions for United States soldiers, and further 
questioned why the troops still fought in Russia after the armistice. The Chicago Tribune and 
New York Times likewise overstated the significance of the event. 
 
On the following day, the newspapers thrashed President Wilson for his policy in North 
Russia. The editorials depicted families pleading in telegrams to Wilson to "immediately" 
 
 
 
 
82 Ibid. 
83 Moore The History of the American Expedition Fighting the Bolsheviki, 226. 
84 U.S. Troops Mutiny On Archangel Front, Washington Post, April 11, 1919.  
85 Ibid. 
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withdraw American troops.87 Furthermore, the papers accused the British of censoring the 
soldiers’ letters to home in order to conceal the harsh conditions in Russia.88 Moreover, the paper 
criticized President Wilson for sending inadequate forces into Russia, and claimed that Wilson 
had sent the American troops into a hopeless situation. These reports applied pressure on 
President Wilson to withdraw the troops. 
In response to the whirlwind of the press reports, Senator Johnson renewed his appeal to 
withdraw the troops in order to gain political momentum against the League of Nations. Wilson 
believed that collective security, managed by such a league, was the key to a lasting postwar 
peace. Republican Senator Johnson stated his resentment against the British authority over 
American troops to build his argument against a League of Nations. The Washington Post quoted 
Johnson saying American troops faced, "harshness" from their British commanders. Moreover, 
Johnson titled his response for an American withdrawal, "Lets be Americans Again."89 Johnson 
 
stated that the administration's response about the status of American troops in North Russia was, 
"in the hands of the allied council in Europe."90 In addition, he argued that a proxy League of 
Nations already existed with the allied council. Finally, Johnson asserted that if the United States 
joined the League of Nations, the U.S. would be drawn into conflicts like the one in Russia 
without the assent of the American people: 
 
This allied council is nothing but the existing league of nations. If the American people 
desire war, let it be declared, and if declared by Congress, the soldiers sent to fight would 
amply supported, but under the orders of foreign nations Americans wage war without 
declaration by the American Congress or the consent of the American people.91 
 
 
 
 
87 Letters from Archangel Front Tell How Troops There Had to Suffer, Washington Post, April 12, 1919. 
88 Ibid. 
89 U.S. Troops Mutiny on Archangel Front, Washington Post, April 11, 1919. 
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Senator Johnson used the American people's anger about the Allied war effort in North Russia to 
galvanize resistance to American membership in a League of Nations. Coupled with the 
firestorm of anti-intervention reporting done by the media, Senator Johnson gave a focused voice 
for the withdrawal of U.S. troops. In turn, the political backlash toward the President forced his 
administration to consider ordering an immediate withdrawal. 
U.S. Army brigadier General Wild Richardson arrived in Archangel on April 17, and 
after evaluating the circumstances in Russia, he advised the War Department to withdraw all 
American troops as quickly as possible. He believed that the American troops faced severe 
fatigue due to the lack of reinforcements.92 After his recommendation, American troops finally 
left the North Russian hell and returned home. In order to replace the 5000 American troops, 
British reserves arrived in Archangel. Soon thereafter, the Bolsheviks overran their positions and 
retook Murmansk and Archangel. 
 
Now penned the "Polar Bears," troops arrived back home and reported that the press 
vastly over exaggerated the mutiny. A soldier from Company I told the NY Times, "We kicked 
like hell, but we didn't mutiny."93 The press confirmed that indeed no mutiny had occurred, but 
the reports about the harsh British commanders and the troops yearning for an explanation of 
why they fought in Russia were completely accurate. The troops ultimately felt that the 
administration undermined their mission by limiting the amount of American troops in North 
Russia and by failing to define their mission. 
 
In conclusion, Wilson hoped that a small American expeditionary force that landed in 
North Russia would spark a Russian revolt against the Soviets, whom he believed had been 
92 U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, "Historical Files of the American Expeditionary Force, North 
Russia, 1918-1919,”M 924, Roll 1, 23-11.4. 
93 Deny American Unit Mutinied in Russia, New York Times, June 16, 1919. 
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installed into power by Germany. This ultimately failed because the British command led the 
expeditionary force on an offensive campaign in Russia. This offensive proved to be very 
successful, however, because Wilson refused to send more troops to Russia, the offensive 
operations ceased and the Soviets were able to regroup. 
After the surrender of Germany, Wilson refused to signal a U.S. policy in Russia. The 
American public began to wonder why American troops still fought on foreign soil. In turn, the 
public pressured congress to order the President to withdraw U.S. troops. While this failed, it 
gave the troops great anxiety as to why they were fighting, which ultimately led to the alleged 
mutiny. The press spread the rumor that an alleged mutiny had occurred in North Russia. Senator 
Johnson and the American public urged President Wilson to withdraw the expeditionary force 
immediately. After immense pressure from the public and commanders on the ground, Wilson 
ordered the withdrawal of United States forces from Russia, which allowed the Soviets to defeat 
the allies resulting in the fall of Murmansk and Archangel. 
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